



# To (Under/Over) Screen or Not to (Under/Over) Screen, That is the Question

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# Executive Summary

*Underscreening / Overscreening* occur given the uncertainty associated with risk assessment and limited security resources available.

*Right Screening* is ideal, but challenging to attain for all passengers.

TSA Precheck implicitly focuses on underscreening, which is why it makes the air system safer, in low risk, cost-constrained environments.



# November 2014 Presentation

Discussed the benefits of prescreening.

Discussed how economics can impact the screening resources allocation and utilization equation.

Introduced the concepts of underscreening and overscreening.



# Screening Assessment

What is known: As risk increases, likelihood of a security threat outcome increases.

What is not known: Exact relationship between risk and security outcome.



# Security Resources

What is known: Security resources are limited.

What is not known: Exact manner in how security resource limitations impact their allocation.

\* Stochastic Knapsack Problem



# Retrospective Security Resource Allocation

Know everyone's risk before they enter security screening; allocate security resources to match risk.

Final Assessments: Was there a successful attack?  
Was the system being tested?

Assumptions:

Security resources are limited.

Screening procedures make errors

\* False alarms, False clears.



# Screening Procedure Reality

Screening decisions are made in **real-time**.

Each passenger has a risk profile

\* Used to determine the security resources allocated to their screening.

Three possible scenarios:

Right Screening

Under Screening

Over Screening



# Right Screening

Security resources allocated to a passenger *match* the retrospective security resource allocation.

## **Multilevel Passenger Screening Problem (MPSP):**

Maximizes the security of the system, subject to

- 1) security resource constraints / limitations,
- 2) performance limitations of these resources,
- 3) security devices / procedures may be assigned to multiple security classes.





# Over / Under Screening

Security resources allocated to a passenger do not match the retrospective security resource allocation

Under  $\equiv$  too few resources are allocated

Over  $\equiv$  too many resources are allocated



# Consequences

## Underscreening

Security resources are under-utilized.

**Will system be more vulnerable?**

## Overscreening

Security resources are over-utilized

Is system being too cautious?

**Will system be more vulnerable?**



# By How Much?

One can count ...

- 1) Number of passengers that are under/over screened,
- 2) How far are passengers under/over screened.
  - The number of security classes below /above the correct class a passenger should be assigned.

Question: Does it matter WHO is under/over screened?



# Key Factors and Assumptions

There is inherent risk in the system.

\*  $P\{\text{A passenger is carrying a threat with nefarious intent}\}$ .

System risk is low.

Security must estimate this level of risk.

\* Tendency is to overestimate level of risk.



# Overestimating Risk


True risk level ( $\mu$ ) < estimated risk level ( $\mu'$ ).

System is safer ( $\mu$ ) than people believe it to be ( $\mu'$ ).

Resources remain limited for each security class.



# Underscreening Error



$$\mu' = .05$$

M = Number of security classes



# Discussion

When risk is overestimated, **high value** security resources get used on **low risk passengers**, which may leave fewer high value security resources available for **high risk passengers**.

This leads to high risk passengers being underscreened, particularly as high value security resources get depleted.



# Discussion

When risk is underestimated, high value security resources get used primarily on **high risk passengers**, which targets more closely the high value security resources for **high risk passengers**.






# Overscreening Error

$$\mu' = .05$$

M = Number of security classes



(b)



# Discussion

When risk is overestimated, **high value** security resources get used on **low risk passengers**, which may leave fewer high value security resources available for **high risk passengers**.

This also leads to low and medium risk passengers being overscreened.



# Discussion

When risk is underestimated, **high value** security resources get used primarily on **high risk passengers**, which targets more closely the high value security resources for **high risk passengers**.



# Key Observations


In low risk environments, overestimating risk leads to a greater mismatch between security resources and passenger risk.

In low risk environments, underestimating risk leads to lower levels of underscreening and (mostly, for  $M$  small) lower levels of overscreening, compared to overestimating risk.



# By How Much?

When passengers are under/over screened, can we quantify by how much?



$\mu' = .05$   
 $M = 8$



# What about in High Risk Environments?

Resources are typically too constrained to be effective.

Most passengers are underscreened.

Systems may need to be shut down (9/11).



# Consequences

By underestimating system risk, fewer passengers are incorrectly screened than when system risk is overestimated

TSA Precheck exhibits this effect.

TSA Precheck makes the air system safer.

\* Resource matching



# Gaming Strategies

Blocking

Overtaxing

Timing

Trial and Testing

All can disrupt the system in  
limited resource environments





## References

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# Thank you

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