

Deterrence

Is it effective and how to make it better

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WHY ME?

→ Does Security Work?

- Initial Conclusion: Of course it works!

→ Why does Security work? Is this Detection or Deterrence (or both)?

- Is Deterrence effective?
- Ask a Social Scientist... So I did!

→ Outline:

- Understand Deterrence
- Learn from it
- Improve it

→ Deterrence

- Structured openness needed in processes
- Continuous forward-looking Gap Analysis
- Improve top-down information flow and bottom-up performance flow
- Audit

WEIGHT GAIN ANALOGY

→ Remediation – response to gained weight

- The longer gain goes unnoticed, the worse it gets



▶ Detection

- Scale (to measure performance)
- Detects nothing if no gain
- Only detects after the fact

▶ Deterrence

- Reduce unhealthy food & habits
- Increase awareness

→ We need all three

→ Let's talk about Deterrence



CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

→ Specific Deterrence and General/Indirect Deterrence

→ Extensive reviews ... with conflicting assessments



– Despite numerous studies using a variety of data sources, sanctions, crime types, statistical methods and theoretical approaches, **there remains little agreement** in the scientific literature **about whether**, how, under what circumstances, to what extent, for which crimes, at what cost, for which individuals, and perhaps most importantly, in which direction do various aspects of contemporary **criminal sanctions affect subsequent criminal behavior**.

→ Interesting, but not really what Security is about


- Preventative, not punitive

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

→ Game Theory (Schelling)

→ Strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started

- An inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power, could deter a more powerful adversary



→ Kissinger, Perry, Shultz, Nunn (WSJ '07)

- Reversed their previous position and asserted that far from making the world safer, nuclear weapons had become a source of extreme risk.
 - Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive strategic response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms races and nuclear terrorism than it was to the cold war.

→ Closer, but...

FRAUD DETERRENCE

→ Sarbanes Oxley

- The intent of the U.S. Congress... was attempting to proactively **deter** financial misrepresentation (Fraud) **in order to** ensure more accurate financial reporting to **increase** investor **confidence**.

→ Premise: Fraud is not random – conditions must be right

→ Proactive identification and removal of causal & enabling factors

- Remove root causes and enablers, possibly revealing other opportunities
- Improved procedures are the best defense

→ Deterrence != Detection

- Detection: identify non-conforming transaction
- Deterrence: analyze conditions and procedures

→ Short term (procedural) and Long term (cultural) initiatives

HOW DOES IT WORK? COSO MODEL

→ Control Environment

- Top-Down culture of ethics in Management

→ Risk Assessment

- Look forward to identify gaps

→ Control Activities

- Do (only) what you intend – no more, no less

→ Information & Communication

- Information flows Down to line
- Performance flows Up (informally & formally) – Objective Feedback

→ Monitoring

- Audit

WILL/DOES COSO WORK FOR SECURITY?

→ Control Environment

- How do we control society from top-down?

→ Risk Assessment

- Opportunity for improvement: Gap analysis



→ Control Activities

- Strict ConOps in place
- Danger: Impediment to innovation

→ Information & Communication

- Information flows Down, Performance flows Up

→ Monitoring

- Audit, Audit, Audit!

OTHER KINDS OF FRAUD

→ Laboratory

- Environmental / Laboratory

- Deliberate falsification of analytical and quality assurance results... historically been detected either by reports from disgruntled employees or electronic data audits. In both of these circumstances the laboratory is **already performing fraudulent work and the damage is done**.

- *Best Practices for the Detection and Deterrence of Laboratory Fraud*, California Military Environmental Coordination Committee [1997]

→ Academic

- Replication study – 36%
- Do terrorists need to replicate? Can we use this? (perhaps not for deterrence)

HOW CAN WE USE THIS IN SECURITY?

→ Detection

- Keep improving scales
- Invent new scales
- By the time we detect, the damage may be done

→ Deterrence

- Structured openness needed in processes
- Must have **continuous** forward-looking Gap Analysis
- Improve top-down information flow and bottom-up performance flow
- Audit

→ Ultimate Deterrence – ban travel!

- Balance controls against Freedom

QUESTIONS?

→ Thank You