

Next Generation Screening Technologies and Processes for the Checkpoint

Trade-offs to increasing security and adding checkpoints

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- **Airline passengers are now extremely safe from terrorism**
- **They can never be made completely safe except by closing down the industry**
- **Instead of seeing to increase safety, it may make more sense to seek to lower the costs of airline security while maintaining much the same level of risk reduction**
- **Expanding Pre-Check is a measure that does that**

Are We Safe Enough? Measuring and Assessing Aviation Security

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John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart

***TERROR,
SECURITY,
AND MONEY***

*Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and
Costs of Homeland Security*

2011

JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART

**CHASING
GHOSTS**

THE POLICING OF TERRORISM



2016

ARE WE SAFER?

HOW SAFE ARE WE?

How much should we be willing to pay for a small reduction in probabilities that are already extremely low?

—Howard Kunreuther, 2002

ACCEPTABLE RISK

Chance worldwide that an individual airline passenger will be killed by terrorists on an individual flight:

1973-2015: 1 in 25 million

2002-2015: 1 in 105 million

2002-2015:

22 times more likely to die on an airliner from an accident than from terrorism

Need to fly once per day for 30,000 years before being involved in a terrorist attack

Given existing security layers

success in hijacking attempt: one in 200

success in downing with passenger-borne bomb: one in 50

Reducing the costs of aviation security

Reduce FAMS, increase FFDO, add secondary barriers:

No change in risk reduction

Hundreds of millions of savings per year

Improving efficiency

50% PreCheck:

Probably slight improvement in risk reduction

Benefit of billions in screening costs, passenger experience

Does terrorism constitute a “threat”?

Six killed per year in US by Islamist terrorists since 9/11

Are security measures responsible for this?

Disclosed terrorists within the US

Undisclosed terrorists

 **The unreported**

 **The Al Capone approach**

 **The deterred**

 **The smart ones**

 **Incompetent**

 **Ineffective**

 **Unintelligent**

 **Idiotic**

 **Ignorant**

 **Inadequate**

 **Unorganized**

 **Misguided**

 **Muddled**

 **Amateurish**

 **Dopey**

 **Unrealistic**

 **Moronic**

 **Irrational**

 **Foolish**

 **Gullible**

Brian Jenkins: Their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor.